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Abstract 
 
Almost a decade after the complete sequencing of the human genome, we have seen a 
proliferation of genetic testing services marketed directly to the consumer and purporting to use 
genetic information to generate individualized health information.   These tests have been subject 
to only minimal regulation, despite the fact that scientists and policymakers have serious 
concerns about both the clinical effectiveness of the tests and the safety of releasing certain types 
of health information to the public without the supervision of a health care professional.  
Proponents of minimal regulation argue that the tests allow for patient autonomy and privacy of 
genetic information, while unburdened marketing of the tests encourages increased development 
and innovation of testing services.  This article explores in depth both the benefits of direct to 
consumer genetic testing and the concerns arising from such tests, and concludes that particular 
safety and accuracy concerns warrant increased oversight of these tests.  The article then goes on 
to evaluate the current regulatory framework under which direct to consumer genetic testing 
services operate, and finds that it is insufficient in light of these concerns.  The article concludes 
that recent steps by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to exercise increased regulation 
over direct to consumer genetic tests are warranted and will provide the optimal amount of 
regulation for these tests. iii 
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I.  Introduction: the Human Genome Project and the advent of direct to consumer 
genetic testing 
 
In 2003, the Human Genome Project released the completed sequence of the human genome.
1  
The media and the scientific community at the time heralded this accomplishment as “the key to 
transforming medicine and understanding disease,”
2 predicting the usefulness of the human 
genome for the development of new treatments, the customization of drugs to individual genetic 
profiles, and the identification of individual propensities to develop specific diseases.
3   
Scientists also warned, however, that the sequencing of the human genome was simply the first 
step on a “long road”
4 of scientific research and that “immediate major breakthroughs should not 
be expected.”
5 
The completion of the human genome opened a new era of human genetic and medical 
research.  Riding this new wave of discovery have emerged a bevy of private companies offering 
what have come to be termed direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing services.
6  As the name 
implies, these tests are marketed directly to consumers and can be purchased and completed 
without the involvement of a medical health care professional.
7  These tests are offered for a 
variety of purposes, from predicting a child’s eye color to determining an individual’s response 
to AIDS treatment.
8   Most of these tests fall within a regulatory grey area; thus, the DTC genetic 
testing industry has to this point remained largely unregulated.
9 
                                                 
1 Wired.com, Human Genome Complete, http://www.wired.com/medtech/health/news/2003/04/58471. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., Justin P. Annes et al., Risks of Presymptomatic Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 363 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1100, 1100 (2010). 
7 Id. 
8 For example, the genetic testing service 23andMe provides information for both of these purposes with the 
purchase of a 23andMe genetic “health kit.” 23andMe.com, Health Reports: Complete List, 
https://www.23andme.com/health/all/.  
9 See, e.g., Rebecca Andar Novick, One Step at a Time: Ethical Barriers to Home Genetic Testing and Why the U.S. 
Health Care System is Not Ready, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 621, 624-631.  
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Almost a decade after the human genome has been sequenced, we are beginning to 
understand more about the risks and benefits of direct- to- consumer genetic testing.  A detailed 
examination of these risks and benefits suggests that recent steps by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) to comprehensively regulate DTC genetic tests as Class III medical 
devices requiring premarket approval
10 are steps in the right direction, and will lead to increased 
safety, effectiveness, and public trust of the DTC genetic testing industry.  
II. The science behind direct to consumer genetic tests  
Direct to consumer genetic tests are marketed for a variety of purposes.  Some tests are 
specifically marketed as a means of ascertaining genetic ancestry or other relationship-based 
information, such as the gender of an unborn child.
11  Also popular, and the focus of this paper, 
are the health-based tests, which provide a range of health and medical information.  
Specifically, pharmacogenetic tests purport to provide information about the suitability and 
efficacy of a particular drug for the individual consumer.
12  Predictive genetic tests are marketed 
as a means of obtaining individualized risk assessments for the acquisition of a particular disease 
or set of diseases,
13 and nutrigenetic tests provide individualized nutrition and lifestyle 
information based on a consumer’s genetic profile.
14  Many testing companies offer all three of 
these services.
15   
The science of genetic testing is based on the simple idea that an individual’s personal 
                                                 
10 In September 2010, FDA sent letters to five DTC genetic testing companies, requesting that these companies 
submit premarket approval applications for their products.  See FDA.gov, Medical Devices Letters to Industry, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/ucm111104.htm. 
11 For example, the company Ancestry.com offers a genetic test to “help you find genetic cousins and expand your 
family tree.” Ancestry.com, DNA Testing by Ancestry.com, http://dna.ancestry.com/welcome.aspx.  
12 See, e.g., Novick, supra note 8, at 632-3. 
13 Id. at 633-4. 
14 Id. at 632. 
15 For example, the genetic testing service Navigenics will “analyze[] your DNA for genetic risk markers associated 
with a wide variety of health conditions and medication responses,” so that a consumer can “personalize [his] health 
strategies.”  Navigenics.com, Conditions and Medication Responses, 
http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/what_we_offer/conditions_we_cover/.   
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genetic makeup can provide a wealth of varied and valuable information.  Although this is 
certainly true, an understanding of the specific scientific underpinnings of these tests is necessary 
to understand both their strengths and their limitations.  
A.  The genetics of genetic testing 
The “human genome” refers to the genetic information encoded by the 23 pairs of chromosomes 
found in the nuclei of most cells in the human body.
16  Chromosomes are composed of two 
intertwining strands of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and each strand of DNA, in turn, is 
composed of a series of nucleotides.
17  A nucleotide (adenine, thymine, cytosine, or guanine) in a 
single strand of DNA is bonded to a complementary nucleotide on the second intertwined strand, 
forming a base pair.
18  
Mutations in genetic information can occur in a variety of ways.
19  Mutations may occur 
during cell division as a copy of an organism’s genetic information is made and included in the 
new cell.
20  Genetic information may be added or deleted from a gene, or base pairs may be 
rearranged within a gene.
21  During this copying process, single nucleotides may also be 
miscoded (for example, an adenine may be replaced by a cytosine), leading to what are known as 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs).
22  SNPs are inherited from parent to child, and 
continuing research is divining correlations between the identity of specific SNPs and various 
health-related measures, such as susceptibility to certain diseases or responsiveness to certain 
drugs.
23  
                                                 
16 ELDRA PEARL SOLOMON ET AL., BIOLOGY G-16 (4th
 ed. 1996). 
17 Id. at 272-7. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 303-9. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS 182 (2d 
ed. 2005). 
23 Id.  
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Companies currently offering DTC health-based genetic tests rely on SNPs to provide 
inexpensive genetic testing.  Rather than sequencing an individual’s entire genome, which is still 
infeasible due to cost, DTC genetic testing companies use a “SNP chip” to target particular SNPs 
in an individual’s genetic material.
24  By determining the identity of a range of an individual’s 
SNPs, these companies, drawing on current scientific research associating particular SNP 
profiles with health-related measures such as susceptibility to disease, purport to provide 
individualized health information to the consumer.
25  Each type of genetic test uses a SNP chip 
to obtain genetic information and then draws on research from the relevant fields to draw 
potentially useful conclusions.  
B.  Pharmocogentic tests 
Pharmocogenetic tests use current research associating particular genetic profiles with 
responsiveness to specific drugs to provide individualized drug responsiveness information to the 
consumer.
26  For example, certain SNPs in the CYP2C9 gene have been found to be associated 
with an individual’s ability to metabolize Warfarin, a drug prescribed as a blood thinner.
27  This 
association has been well-documented, and in fact the FDA has stated that genetic testing could 
play an important role in determining individualized dosages of Warfarin.
28  The DTC genetic-
testing company 23andMe provides information to consumers about predicted Warfarin 
responsiveness based on the consumer’s variant of the CYP2C9 gene.
29  The company also 
                                                 
24 R. RAPLEY R. & S. HARBRON, MOLECULAR ANALYSIS AND GENOME DISCOVERY (2004). 
25 23andMe, for example, states that their DNA chip “genotypes hundreds of thousands of SNPs at one time,” and 
the company also “hand-pick[s] tens of thousands of additional SNPs of particular interest from the scientific 
literature and adds their corresponding probes to the DNA chip… to provide personal genetic information.”  
23andMe.com, How Does 23andMe Genotype my DNA?, https://www.23andme.com/you/faqwin/chip/.    
26 See, e.g., Novick, supra note 8, at 632-3. 
27 See, e.g., Wadelius et al., Association of Warfarin Dose with Genes Involved in its Action and Metabolism, 121 
Hum. Genet. 23, 23-34 (2004). 
28 FDA.gov, Critical Path Initiative- Warfarin Dosing, 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/CriticalPathInitiative/FacesBehindCriticalPath/ucm077473.htm. 
29 23andMe.com, Warfarin Sensitivity-Sample Report, https://www.23andme.com/health/Warfarin-Coumadin- 
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provides predictive response information for 18 other treatments and drugs, ranging from 
information regarding an individual’s susceptibility to heroin addiction, to information about an 
individual’s predicted response to Hepatitis C treatment.
30  Although some of the associations 
upon which this information is based-- including the association between Warfarin 
metabolization and CYP2C9 variants-- are well-grounded in many years of research, other 
associations are much more tentative and are based only upon a single recent study.
31   
C.  Predictive tests 
Predictive tests, as their name implies, are marketed for the purpose of “predicting” whether an 
individual will develop a specific disease in his lifetime based on his genetic profile.
32  When 
evaluating genetic susceptibility for disease, an important distinction must be made between the 
Mendelian, or monogenic, diseases on the one hand and the complex, or polygenic, diseases on 
the other.
33   Monogenic diseases are hereditary diseases that are caused by a mutation in a single 
gene.
34  These diseases may exhibit complete penetrance, meaning that all individuals carrying 
the relevant mutation will exhibit symptoms of the disease at some point in their lives.
35  
Familiar examples of monogenic diseases include Huntington’s disease and cystic fibrosis.
36  In 
contrast, complex or polygenic diseases do not exhibit Mendelian inheritance patterns and are 
thought to arise due to a complex interaction of several genetic and environmental influences.
37  
Associations linking particular genetic mutations to polygenic disease susceptibility are 
                                                                                                                                                            
Sensitivity/.  
30 23andMe.com, Health Reports: Complete List, https://www.23andme.com/health/all/. 
31 For example, 23andMe’s association between genetics and response to a subset of antidepressant drugs is based 
on a single study.  23andMe.com, Antidepressant Response- Sample Report, 
https://www.23andme.com/health/Antidepressant-Response/.  
32 See, e.g., Novick, supra note 8, at 633-4. 
33 MICHAEL WINK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR BIOTECHNOLOGY 456 (2006). 
34 Id. 
35 MUIN J. KHOURY ET AL., HUMAN GENOME EPIDEMIOLOGY 38 (2d ed. 2010). 
36 Id. 
37 WINK, supra note 32.  
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necessarily probabilistic; because the development of the disease depends on the interaction of a 
number of known and unknown factors, the most that can be done is to estimate increased risk of 
the disease.  This estimate is derived from population studies comparing individuals carrying a 
specific variant of a gene of interest with others who do not carry that specific variant.
38  
Common examples of polygenic diseases include heart disease and Type II diabetes.
39    
Many DTC predictive tests available on the market today evaluate an individual’s 
susceptibility to polygenic rather than monogenic diseases.  Thus, these tests can only provide 
estimations of risk based on population data.
40  This is again accomplished by linking SNP 
profiles in the individual consumer with associations between particular SNPs and susceptibility 
to certain diseases.  The genetic testing service 23andMe offers predictive information for 95 
diseases and conditions, including “back pain,” attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, 
schizophrenia, lung cancer, and heart disease.
41  
D.  Nutrigenetic tests 
Nutrigenetic tests are similar to predictive tests in that they analyze an individual’s risk of 
disease based on his genetic profile.  The testing company then goes one step further by 
providing individualized diet and lifestyle recommendations based on this analysis, with the goal 
of reducing the individual’s risk.
42  For example, if the genetic test results determined an 
individual to be at increased risk for developing heart disease, the test results would return diet 
and lifestyle recommendations based on the current scientific understanding of reducing risk for 
this disease.  Thus, the consumer would be advised to exercise, avoid tobacco, and eat a diet low 
                                                 
38 D.J. Galton & G.A.A. Ferns, Genetic Markers to Predict Polygenic Disease: a New Problem for Social Genetics, 
92 QUART. J. MED. 223 (1999).   
39 Id. 
40 Galton & Ferns, supra note 37. 
41 23andMe.com, Health Reports: Complete List, https://www.23andme.com/health/all/. 
42 See, e.g., Novick, supra note 8, at 632.  
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in saturated fat and full of fruits and vegetables.   
III. Benefits and drawbacks of DTC genetic testing: implications for regulation 
For many years, scientists and policymakers have discussed the potential benefits and drawbacks 
of DTC genetic testing.
43  The concerns of those who argue for increased regulation of DTC 
genetic tests, foremost among these concerns about accuracy and clinical effectiveness of the 
tests and patient use of results, provide a strong rationale for increased regulation.
44  Those who 
believe that DTC genetic tests should continue to be offered with minimal regulatory 
intervention often point to the benefits of patient autonomy, privacy, and ex ante effects on test 
development;
 45 however, a closer inspection of these potential benefits reveals that they may not 
actually be achieved through the unregulated marketing and use of DTC genetic tests, and may in 
fact be stimulated (or at least not undermined) by increased regulation.   
A.  Concerns with DTC genetic tests 
1.  Consent 
A threshold concern with DTC genetic tests involves the concept of informed consent.
46  The 
idea of obtaining informed consent from a patient before proceeding with a medical procedure or 
treatment is one that is well-established in health jurisprudence.
47  A doctor must discuss the 
risks and benefits of a proposed procedure with a patient and allow the patient to ask questions.
48    
A doctor must also disclose possible alternative procedures and the risks and benefits of such 
alternatives.
49   The rationale behind such a requirement is the protection of an individual’s 
freedom to choose those procedures which she will undergo after having considered the relevant 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., A.L. Maguire et al., Personal Genome Testing, 330 SCIENCE 181-2 (2010). 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 See, e.g., Novick, supra note 8, at 635-40. 
47 See, e.g., L.B. Andrews, The Rationale Behind the Informed Consent Doctrine, 1 J. MED. PRAC. MGMT. 59-65 
(1985). 
48 Novick, supra note 8, at 635. 
49 Id.  
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information.
50  Empirical studies have also shown that both physical and psychological benefits 
accrue to a patient who participates in treatment via an informed consent relationship with a 
health care professional.
51      
DTC genetic tests pose a potential threat to the established model of informed consent.
52  
A typical DTC “patient” orders the genetic test from a website.  Although most companies 
offering DTC genetic tests include detailed information about the testing process on their 
websites, this information is not a substitute for a conversation with a health care professional 
about risks and benefits.  Not surprisingly, the content of these websites is written to persuade as 
well as to inform; although the benefits of undergoing a test are highly touted, there is seldom 
any mention of risk.
53  Also notably missing from the content of these sites is information related 
to the alternatives of either obtaining a genetic test from a health care provider, or foregoing the 
test altogether.
54  Finally, in some unfortunate cases, the information provided on these websites 
may be deliberately misleading.
55   
Proponents of DTC genetic tests may argue that the risks of undergoing these tests are 
minimal and thus the information obtained via a company’s website is sufficient to make an 
informed decision.  As will be discussed, however, potential emotional and physical harms can 
result either directly from test results, or indirectly through patient misinterpretation or misuse of 
                                                 
50 Andrews, supra note 46. 
51 Id. 
52 Novick, supra note 8, at 636. 
53 For example, the genetic testing service deCodeme’s website exclaims the health benefits of using its service and 
prominently includes patient testimonials on its webpage; the only disclaimer is found at the very bottom of the page 
in 8-point font of an almost illegible light grey against a white background.  It states that deCodeme is for 
informational purposes only and “should NOT be used for medical decision making without consulting your 
physician.” deCodeme.com, Genes and Health, http://www.decodeme.com/genes-and-health.  
54 Of the major testing companies 23andMe, deCodeme, and Navigenics, there is no mention on the companies’ 
respective websites of the option of not testing. 
55 See Gregory Kutz, DIRECT TO CONSUMER GENETIC TESTS: MISLEADING TEST RESULTS ARE FURTHER 
COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE MARKETING AND OTHER QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES, GAO 10-847T , at 15 (2010).  
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results.
56  These risks are magnified when a patient does not consult with a health care 
professional in any stage of the testing process.
57   
Some of the leading DTC genetic testing companies do offer over-the-phone (or over-the-
web) genetic counseling services; however, this is insufficient as a mechanism for true informed 
consent for a variety of reasons.
58  First, the counseling is often not mandatory.
59  Given that 
many of the consumers of DTC genetic testing services may be those who have particularly 
strong privacy or autonomy concerns,
60 it is likely that a majority of these consumers will choose 
not to discuss their personal medical concerns with a counselor.  Second, incentives offered to 
consumers by the companies with regard to counseling services might disrupt the informed 
consent process.
61  For example, the popular DTC genetic testing company 23andMe offers free 
genetic counseling services only after a patient has purchased access to the test.
62   When trying 
to decide whether or not to test, this is clearly unhelpful to a consumer.  Finally, when a 
company does offer genetic counseling services prior to testing, these services may be tainted by 
the same bias towards testing that is evidenced on the company’s websites.
63  Although 
potentially biasing financial incentives exist in any patient-provider relationship, these incentives 
are more troubling when unbuffered (unlike in most healthcare situations) by insurance and other 
intermediaries.
64 
2.  Accuracy and utility concerns 
                                                 
56 See, e.g., Alberto Gutierrez, FDA official, Interview with the New York Times, 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/health/12genome.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=gutierrez%20FDA%20genetic%20te
sting&st=cse (June 11, 2010). 
57 Id. 
58 Novick, supra note 8, at 635-40. 
59 None of the three major genetic testing services companies (23andMe deCodeme and Navigenics) requires 
mandatory genetic counseling, although they all offer these services to varying degrees.  
60 See supra  page 18, the discussion of the potential benefits of home genetic testing.  
61 Novick, supra note 8, at 635-40. 
62 23andMe.com, 23andMe Enlists Informed Medical Decisions to Make Independent Genetic Counseling Services 
Available to Customers, https://www.23andme.com/about/press/20100603/.  
63 Novick, supra note 8, at 640. 
64 Id.  
10 
 
a.  Clinical effectiveness and accuracy 
Once a patient decides to proceed with a genetic test, concerns of test accuracy and clinical 
usefulness move to the forefront.  These concerns are especially apparent with health-based tests 
purporting to provide “predictive” information about individual disease risk, and inhere from the 
probabilistic nature of risk prediction for polygenic diseases.
65  Scientists have reached a general 
consensus that current known associations between a given SNP and a given disease are 
generally so attenuated that they provide little useful predictive information.
66  For example, a 
2008 paper in Science evaluating the usefulness of the type of studies relied on by DTC genetic 
testing companies (referred to in the paper as genome-wide association studies, or GWAS) found 
that “variants so far identified by GWASs together explain only a small fraction of the overall 
inherited risk of each disease (for example, ~10% of the variance for Crohn’s [Disease] and ~5% 
for [Type 2 Diabetes]).  The primary value of [these associations] is not risk prediction, but 
providing novel insights about mechanisms of disease.”
67  Although the authors did not 
completely dismiss the future clinical utility of predictive genetic tests, they determined that “the 
extent to which genetic information will figure in ‘personalized medicine’ will depend on 
whether predictive accuracy beyond conventional measures can be attained, and whether there 
are interventions whose effectiveness is improved by knowledge of a genetic test.”
68  Similarly, 
the author of a review article in the New England Journal of Medicine explained that “what is 
becoming clear from these early attempts at genetically based risk assessment is that currently 
known variants explain too little about the risk of disease occurrence to be of clinically useful 
                                                 
65 See, e.g., David Altshuter et al., Genetic Mapping in Human Disease, 322 SCIENCE 881, 881 (2008). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 885, 886. 
68 Id. at 887.   
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predictive value.”
69  The author of this article came to the conclusion that “patients inquiring 
about [GWAS] testing should be advised that at present the results of such testing have no value 
in predicting risk and are not clinically [useful].”
70  Thus, those most acquainted with the science 
agree that although predictive testing may play a future role in medicine, the science has not yet 
evolved to the point where the kinds of information that DTC genetic testing services are 
purporting to offer can be reliably obtained and usefully applied.  
b.  The importance of external factors in predicting disease 
Because DTC genetic tests are focused on predicting risk for polygenic diseases, which result 
from a number of unknown environmental and genetic factors in addition to the genetic 
association identified and relied upon by the testing service, personal context is extremely 
important in interpreting test results.
71  In many cases, this external contextual information is an 
even better predictor of disease than the association relied upon by the testing service.  For 
example 23andMe offers a test for genetic susceptibility to lung cancer, although it is well 
known that the degree of risk for lung cancer attributable to genetic factors is dwarfed by the risk 
introduced by a patient’s status as a smoker or non-smoker.
72  Family history of disease also 
often provides a better prediction of susceptibility to a given disease.
73  A DTC genetic test can 
be misleading insofar as it does not evaluate or report to the consumer (and in some cases the 
testers may not even be aware of the nature of) relevant external information that may have a 
much greater impact on an individual’s susceptibility to disease.    
                                                 
69 Teri A. Manolio, Genomewide Association Studies and Assessment of the Risk of Disease, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
166, 173 (2010). 
70 Id. at 173-74. 
71 Carla G. van El & Martina C. Cornel, Genetic Testing and Common Disorders in a Public Health Framework: 
Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, 176 EU. J. HUM. GENETICS 1, 3 (2011).  
72 Although 23andMe’s website makes clear that smoker status is the best predictor of lung cancer, similar situations 
could arise in which research has not yet revealed external risk factors whose predictive value is significantly greater 
than known genetic contributors.   
73 Van El & Comel, supra note 70.  
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c.  Effects of ethnicity and other factors on test validity 
Even to the extent that the numbers provided by DTC genetic health tests have meaning, the 
meaning is limited to those whose ethnicity, approximate age, and gender match the underlying 
populations (usually white, middle aged men) on which the association studies are based.
74  The 
findings of these studies are heavily dependent on such factors.
75  Although some of the DTC 
testing companies’ websites mention this caveat, they do not explicitly state that their tests are 
not recommended for certain populations, although for these groups most of the test results may 
be essentially meaningless.
76 
d.  Intra-industry variation in test results 
These fundamental concerns about the predictive value of DTC genetic tests are exacerbated by 
intra-industry variation in test results.
77  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released 
a report on DTC genetic testing services on July 22, 2010.
78  Among its findings, the report 
determined that there was a lack of standardization of test results among companies.
79  In other 
words, an individual testing with two different companies might be told that he is at increased 
risk for a particular disease by one testing company and that he is at decreased risk for the same 
disease by another testing company.
80  The report also cited potentially even more troubling 
concerns in the DTC genetic testing industry, including deceptive marketing practices and 
                                                 
74 David Altshuter et al., supra note 64, at 884.   
75 Id. 
76 Of the major testing companies 23andMe, deCodeme, and Navigenics, only 23andMe mentions ethnicity.  It does 
so in the context of specific tests.  For example, it states on the prostate cancer information page that because a study 
including Japanese Americans was inconclusive, “the exact association in populations with Asian ancestry still 
needs to be confirmed.”  Presumably, this was only mentioned because a study in Asian Americans was in fact 
performed.  There is no mention of ethnicity for other studies performed in only a single ethnic group.  
23andMe.com, Prostate Cancer Sample Report, https://www.23andme.com/health/Prostate-Cancer/. 
77 Gregory Kutz, supra note 54, at 5. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Justin P. Annes et al., supra note 5, at 1100.   
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erroneous medical management advice.
81  These considerations further undermine the potential 
utility of such tests.   
e.  The possibility of conflicting recommendations 
Finally, scientists worry that the nature of the DTC predictive tests currently being offered, 
which screen for predisposition to many conditions at a single time, might result in conflicting 
recommendations that are confusing or even dangerous to a consumer.
82  For example, a 
nutrigenetic/predictive test might reveal that a consumer is predisposed both to osteoarthritis and 
Type II Diabetes.  The consumer might of her own volition or upon the recommendation of the 
testing company decide to begin taking Glucosamine, a nutritional supplement that has been 
reported to help prevent and ease the symptoms of osteoarthritis.
83  However, Glucosamine may 
affect insulin sensitivity in certain populations, potentially exacerbating diabetic symptoms or 
precipitating the onset of diabetes.
84  DTC genetic testing companies are currently unprepared to 
deal with such potential complexities arising from the testing process.
85  
3.  Patient interpretation and use of results 
Even if a consumer could be assured of receiving accurate, consistent, and non-misleading 
information from a DTC genetic testing service, a proposition that has been seriously questioned 
in the previous section, there remain health concerns arising from the patient’s interpretation and 
use of such results. 
a.  Patient interpretation 
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First, the very nature of these tests gives rise to a problem of consumer interpretation.  As 
previously discussed, these tests rely on association studies linking particular SNPs to incidence 
of a particular trait (such as disease or reaction to a drug) in the general population.  The results 
of these studies yield a very specific type of statistical information that has meaning for 
researchers in the field, but may be meaningless (or at the very least difficult to understand and 
interpret) for an individual consumer.
86  That is not to say that consumers could not or should not 
be educated in the nuances of statistics and thus learn to interpret their test results in a 
sophisticated manner.  However, when these problems of interpretation are combined with the 
accuracy problems outlined above, we may question whether it is worth undertaking this 
educational effort when the end result will be sophisticated interpretation of results that have 
little value in the first instance.  In the meantime, misinterpretation or misuse of results could 
lead to serious concerns. 
b.  Psychological response to test results 
One of these concerns is that consumers may be emotionally devastated by test results, and will 
lack the resources in a home testing environment to obtain appropriate psychological support.  
This argument is intimately related to the issue of informed consent.
87  Recent research, 
however, suggests that this particular concern may be unfounded.
88  An empirical study 
performed by Cinnamon Bloss and colleagues and reported in the New England Journal of 
Medicine found that consumers undergoing DTC genetic testing did not score significantly 
higher on stress-related indicators upon learning that they were at increased risk for a particular 
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disease such as heart disease or cancer.
89  The study does suggest, however, that these results 
may be partly attributed to the sample utilized in the study, since subjects who completed the 
study were self-selecting to some degree and likely had an above-average understanding of 
genetic testing.
90  Continued empirical research will be helpful in gauging the extent to which 
DTC genetic testing raises concerns about psychological harm resulting from adverse test results. 
c.  Patient action in response to test results 
Perhaps more pressing than the concern that consumers will be devastated by adverse 
information related to their health is the concern that consumers will be falsely reassured by 
positive information.  A finding of “no increased risk” certainly does not mean that a consumer 
exhibits zero risk for contracting a disease, especially since environmental and untested genetic 
factors may play an even greater role in disease onset than the tested marker.  However, a 
consumer may psychologically rely on such information and may undergo increased psychic 
trauma if he or she contracts the disease.  Even more dangerous is the possibility that the patient 
will adversely change her behaviors in reliance upon such information.
91  23andMe, for example, 
tests patients for both increased risk of heroin addiction and immunity to HIV resistance.
92  A 
result of “no increased risk” or “HIV resistant” may lead a patient to engage in risky behaviors 
such as drug use or unprotected sex out of a false sense of immunity from the dangers of 
addiction or infection.   
Related to this concern is the concern with pharmacogentic testing that a patient will use 
test results to make treatment and dosage decisions independent of consultation with a health 
                                                 
89 Id. 
90 Id.at 531. 
91 See, e.g., Alberto Gutierrez, FDA official, Interview with the New York Times, 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/health/12genome.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=gutierrez%20FDA%20genetic%20te
sting&st=cse (June 11, 2010). 
92 23andMe.com, Health Reports: Complete List, https://www.23andme.com/health/all/.   
16 
 
care professional.  The testing service 23andMe offers predictive response information for 19 
treatments and drugs, including predicted response to Hepatitis C treatment.
93  A consumer 
receiving a result that he has reduced chances of responding to such treatment may discontinue 
the treatment without consulting his physician. This is a particularly likely possibility given that 
the treatment entails uncomfortable side effects.  Even when a relationship between predicted 
responsiveness to a drug and a specific genetic profile is well-established and has been found to 
be of clinical usefulness, such as that between Warfarin metabolism and a SNP on the CPY2C9 
gene, dosage is a complex calculation that relies on factors such as patient weight and age, and is 
best performed by a physician.
94 
This concern is more than just hypothetical.  A recent study found that “40% of 
participants with genetic test results indicating increased risk for Alzheimer’s disease 
reported increasing their use of medications or vitamins, compared with 20% of those whose 
results did not indicate increased risk.”
95  
4.  Economic concerns 
Perhaps less pressing than public health concerns, but equally deserving of attention, are the 
economic consequences in engaging in DTC genetic health testing, both for individual 
consumers and society as a whole.   
a.  Waste of consumer money 
The GAO study that found serious problems with the accuracy and marketing of DTC genetic 
health tests concluded that such tests at worse constitute a risk to consumer health and at best are 
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a waste of consumer money.
96  This is not merely a trivial concern, given that the cost of testing 
ranges from hundreds to thousands of dollars per consumer.
97    
b.  Effects on the healthcare system 
A second economic concern expressed by health care professionals is that consumers undergoing 
DTC genetic health tests will subsequently unnecessarily undergo additional tests, screenings, 
and physician consultations, thereby taxing the scarce resources of the healthcare system.
98  For 
example, an individual discovering that she is at increased risk for breast cancer may demand 
additional mammograms not currently indicated for her demographic group.  However, the New 
England Journal of Medicine study tracking individuals’ stress responses to the results of genetic 
health tests found that individuals receiving genetic testing did not generally undergo more 
screenings or tests subsequent to receiving personalized risk information.
99  Further, it could be 
argued that such screenings might actually prove useful and save the healthcare system money in 
the long run by increasing detection among high-risk groups identified by genetic testing.    
Thus, it is unclear what the consequences of wide-spread use of genetic testing would be on the 
healthcare system as a whole. 
c.  Physician liability 
Finally, doctors have expressed concern that widespread use of DTC genetic health tests might 
give rise to increased physician liability.
100  This could occur, for example, if a patient feels that 
a doctor did not respond appropriately to the patient’s disclosure of test results (for example, by 
ordering further tests or screenings) and thus failed to meet the proper standard of care.  This 
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could occur although the doctor may not have the information necessary to appropriately 
interpret the genetic test results, or may have a better understanding of the limitations of such 
tests than the patient himself.  For example, a doctor may place a patient on a particular regimen 
of Hepatitis C treatment although genetic tests reveal that the individual may not respond 
optimally to such treatment because the doctor is also considering other information such as age, 
weight, the severity of illness, and the availability of other treatments.  Although genetic tests 
can potentially provide relevant information that may help a doctor come to an ultimate decision, 
great uncertainty for doctors would result if DTC genetic tests could be introduced to establish a 
standard of care, especially given the extreme limitations of the information provided by such 
tests.  
B.  Potential benefits of DTC genetic tests 
1.  Patient autonomy 
One of the foremost arguments forwarded in support of health-based DTC genetic tests involves 
the promotion of patient autonomy.
101  There has been a trend in recent years for patients to 
become increasingly involved in the promotion of their health in the areas of both diagnosis and 
treatment.
102  Allowing consumers to access DTC genetic testing services independently of a 
physician is arguably simply the next step in encouraging patient engagement and participation 
in health care.  However, this argument has serious flaws.  First, in order for a patient to truly 
make an independent decision regarding his health, he must have sufficient unbiased information 
to make an informed decision, something I have argued is seriously lacking in the context of 
DTC genetic testing.   Second, even to the extent that a patient exercises autonomy in choosing 
to undergo DTC genetic health testing, this autonomy is subsequently limited when the patient is 
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unable, due to a lack of appropriate information, context, and sufficiently predictive results, to 
make informed treatment decisions based on the results of such testing.
103   
Although DTC genetic testing may not provide meaningful opportunity for autonomous 
decision-making in the realm of medical treatment, it can be argued that such testing may 
nevertheless encourage individuals to adopt healthier lifestyles so as to minimize the risks of 
contracting a particular disease.  Such a result would indeed grant patients an opportunity for 
autonomy in making lifestyle decisions, and would also accrue benefits to society as a whole, 
reducing health care costs through preventative action and increasing the overall health and well-
being of those who respond to the tests in this way.  The empirical study performed by Bloss and 
colleagues, however, found that individuals undergoing DTC genetic health testing and finding 
themselves to be at risk for a particular disease (such as heart disease) generally did not respond 
by implementing healthy and appropriate lifestyle changes.
104  An important exception to this 
surprising result was found for those who discussed their test results with a doctor: these 
individuals did in fact implement healthy lifestyle changes.
105  Although it cannot be ruled out 
that individuals in this subgroup were generally more health-motivated overall (and thus were 
more likely both to talk to their physician and to implement healthy lifestyle changes), this 
finding generally supports the idea that autonomy may mean little without appropriate context 
and guidance. 
Even if a patient were in a position to independently choose appropriate medical or 
lifestyle interventions upon receiving his test results, it is not clear that such interventions are 
available.
106  For example, in many cases doctors are uncertain as to the appropriate intervention 
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for slightly increased risk of a disease as opposed to greater risk or onset of the disease itself.
107  
Further, in some cases there are no medically accepted preventative measures to take, even for 
those who are almost certain of contracting a disease (this is the case with both Alzheimer’s 
disease and Huntington’ s disease, for example).
108  A patient might be unduly distressed to learn 
that although she is at increased risk for a disease, there is nothing she can do about it. 
2.  Genetic privacy 
An argument often forwarded by proponents of DTC genetic testing and related to the issue of 
patient autonomy is the argument that DTC genetic tests provide the opportunity for increased 
privacy and control over an individual’s personal genetic information.
109  Such a view reflects 
concerns, arising with the sequencing of the human genome, that an individual’s personal genetic 
information might be used by insurance companies, employers, the government, and others, 
without the permission and to the detriment of the individual.
110  Such concerns are valid, and 
have provoked the response of the federal government.  In 1995, former President Bill Clinton 
issued an executive order prohibiting the federal government from using personal genetic 
information for employment purposes.
111  This order did not extend to private employers, but 
many states subsequently enacted similar legislation that in some cases extended the reach of the 
executive order to insurance companies.
112  Further, in 2008, former President George W. Bush 
signed the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA).
113  GINA provides for more 
comprehensive federal protection of genetic information, and includes prohibitions on the use of 
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genetic information by private employers in making employment decisions and health insurance 
companies in making decisions to raise individual premiums or deny benefits.
114  This legislation 
still contains some gaps (for example, it does not cover life insurance or disability insurance), 
and some have exhibited concerns about enforcement, but generally the reaction of concerned 
groups to the enactment of GINA has been positive.
115   
Although GINA clearly does not address all the concerns of those who worry about 
privacy of genetic information, to the extent that GINA addresses these concerns, the subsequent 
need to  turn to home genetic testing as a self-help measure is thereby lessened.  Further, it is not 
clear that turning to DTC genetic testing fully solves the privacy problem either.  Although the 
major DTC genetic testing companies reassure customers with promises of utmost privacy,
116 it 
is not difficult to imagine situations in which this information might be inadvertently or 
intentionally released to third parties.  DTC genetic testing companies are not regulated entities 
under the comprehensive federal health care information privacy statute, HIPAA.
117   Thus, they 
are not required by law to follow the rigorous guidelines governing protection and release of 
personal health information in other contexts.  Further, it is unclear what will happen to this data 
if a company is sold, merges with another company, or is otherwise dissolved.
118  Thus, the 
popular perception that genetic information is ‘safer’ or ‘more private’ in the hands of private 
companies than it is in the public health care system may well be baseless. 
3.  Ex ante effects on innovation 
Finally, some who see the future potential in DTC genetic testing argue that overly stringent 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 Novick, supra note 8, at 641. 
116 For example, the Navigenics website reassures customers with the rather disturbing statement that “unlike some 
other companies, we do not sell or share your genetic information.” Navigenics.com, What we Offer, 
http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/what_we_offer/.  
117 See Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C.A. §1181 et. seq. 
118 James P. Evans et al., Preparing for a Consumer-Driven Genomic Age,  363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1099 (2010).  
22 
 
regulation of these tests would amount to an effective ban of the tests.
119  In addition to 
eliminating the availability of such tests to those who choose them, such a result would also have 
the consequence of inhibiting product development and improvement.
120  This concern is 
particularly salient given that although scientists are doubtful about the current utility of DTC 
genetic tests, many concede that further scientific developments could lead to increased clinical 
usefulness.
121  However, much of the scientific research on which the increased utility of the 
tests will rely is basic research that is likely to be performed not by the genetic companies 
themselves, but by government sponsored and university research labs.
122  These companies 
already rely heavily on this type of independent research for the current utility of their tests, and 
it is doubtful that they will begin to undertake independent research to validate or improve the 
utility of their product unless required to do so by regulation.  Further, if and when the science 
does advance to a point at which DTC genetic tests are deemed to be of clinical utility, it is 
important that the public’s trust in such tests has not undermined by a long proliferation of 
testing products of doubtful utility.
123 
C.  Summary 
Although it is currently unclear whether some of the concerns regarding DTC genetic testing (for 
example, concerns about economic effects on the healthcare system) are well-founded, other 
concerns, such as those regarding test accuracy and potential response of patients to test results, 
are clearly grounded in empirical research and pose pressing public health issues that should be 
addressed.  Further, the potential benefits of DTC genetic testing, such as patient autonomy and 
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patient privacy, are subject to important caveats.  The clearest benefit of such testing, ex ante 
product development, would likely not be greatly harmed by increased regulation, since the 
current and future utility of these products depends heavily on outside research.   
IV. Current regulation of DTC genetic tests  
Given the important and serious health and safety concerns with DTC genetic tests, the current 
regulatory landscape for these tests is inadequate.  This landscape is filled with grey areas and 
uncertainty.  Several entities currently have jurisdiction to regulate genetic testing, and yet DTC 
genetic health testing has until recently largely slipped through the cracks of these overlapping 
jurisdictions.
124  Only recently has the FDA begun asserting increased control over the producers 
and marketers of DTC genetic tests.
125  
A.  CLIA regulation 
The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) grant the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) authority to regulate laboratory testing of human specimens for the 
diagnosis and/or treatment of disease, including genetic testing.
126  A laboratory wishing to 
perform such tests must thus obtain a federal certificate of approval before doing so.
127  Under 
this regulatory scheme, tests are classified into one of three categories: waived, moderate 
complexity, and high complexity.
128  Tests in the waived category are simple tests that have 
negligible likelihood of a false result and that pose no risk to the patient.
129  Moderate and high 
complexity tests are ranked according to a set of criteria that includes the degree of technical 
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knowledge and individual judgment required to perform the test and reliability of results.  
Genetic tests thus qualify as “high complexity” tests.
130   
Although classified as a high complexity test, genetic testing is not subject to all of the 
stringent proficiency requirements required of other high and moderate complexity tests.
131  
Generally, moderate and high complexity tests must follow quality assurance programs and 
undergo proficiency testing.
132  Proficiency testing, in turn, is based on a categorization system 
of specialties and subspecialties of scientific expertise, each with its own proficiency standards to 
which a lab seeking certification in that area must comply.
133 The proficiency testing assures the 
accuracy of the test and imposes other requirements specific to that specialty.  However, there is 
no subspecialty for genetic testing under CLIA.
134  In the event that a relevant subspecialty does 
not exist, such as for genetic testing, there are no specific proficiency standards to which a lab 
must adhere.
135  Instead, the lab in question is required to “establish and maintain the accuracy of 
its testing procedures,” and may do so in a variety of ways; for example, by conducting its own 
statistical tests of patient results or comparing its test results with another lab.
136   For several 
years, various groups have lobbied for the addition to CLIA of a subspecialty for genetic testing 
in an effort to standardize and improve proficiency requirements for the genetic testing 
industry.
137  However, thus far, such efforts have been to no avail.   
The creation of a genetic subspecialty under CLIA would doubtless improve the 
regulatory environment for genetic testing; however, it is noteworthy that CLIA (whatever 
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standards it imposes) addresses only the accuracy and not the clinical validity of tests.  Thus, it 
does not address situations, often encountered in DTC genetic health tests, where a test may be 
performed correctly, but the results themselves are misleading.  This could occur, for example, if 
a test is based on weak association data or is valid only for a specific ethnic group.  
B.  FTC regulation 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which regulates food and drug advertising, has 
jurisdiction over the advertising of DTC genetic tests.  Although it has acknowledged this 
jurisdiction, the FTC has not at present regulated the marketing of DTC genetic health testing.
138  
The FTC did, however, release a notice to consumers in 2006 stating its concerns with DTC 
genetic tests and recommending that consumers do not use these tests unless under the 
supervision of a doctor.
139   
C.  State regulation    
Local regulation of genetic testing services, and DTC genetic testing services in particular, varies 
from state to state.
140   For general genetic testing services, only two states have implemented 
standards that are more stringent than the federal CLIA standards.
141  DTC genetic tests have 
been regulated more stringently, with several states either banning their use outright, or requiring 
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a prescription for their use.
142  However, because most of these tests are marketed online, 
enforcement of these local regulations poses a problem.
143   
D.  FDA regulation 
FDA has jurisdiction under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act to regulate genetic tests as medical devices, and, more specifically, in vitro 
diagnostic devices (IVDs).
144  The steps with which a medical device company must comply 
before offering the device to the public vary with the FDA’s classification of the device.
145   
Class I devices are classified as low-risk and are subject to the least amount of regulation.
146  
Class II devices are classified as higher-risk and must comply with premarket notification 
(510(k)) procedures as well as being subject to additional controls to assure safety and 
effectiveness.
147  Class III devices, classified as highest-risk, must usually undergo a rigorous 
premarket approval process in which clinical data are submitted to the FDA to demonstrate both 
the safety and effectiveness of the product.
148  
1.  The laboratory-developed test exception 
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Because the clinical effectiveness of many DTC genetic tests has not been established, these tests 
would at least initially be classified as Class III devices and would thus be subject to a rigorous 
premarket approval process.
149  However, DTC genetic tests on the market today have avoided 
this process because of the “home brew” or laboratory- developed test (LTD) exception for 
IVDs.
150  LDTs include tests that are developed in-house by the company offering the testing 
service, rather than those that are marketed to several labs.
151  Because most DTC genetic testing 
services do indeed develop their own tests, this exception is relevant.  FDA has historically 
exercised its discretion to exempt LTDs from premarket approval, due in part to resource 
constraints, but also due in part to FDA’s opinion that LDTs were generally “relatively simple, 
well-understood tests that diagnosed rare diseases and conditions, and that were intended to be 
used by physicians and pathologists in a single institution where they were actively involved in 
patient care.”
152  Although this is true of many LTDs, it is not true of DTC predictive genetic 
tests that are intended to be used independently by consumers and that evaluate propensity to 
develop a wide variety of relatively common diseases.   
In 1998, FDA increased regulatory oversight of LDTs somewhat by promulgating a 
regulation imposing minimal requirements on LDTs with active analyte specific reagents 
(ASRs).
153  In the process of promulgating this regulation FDA considered requiring heightened 
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scrutiny for predictive genetic home brew ASR tests; however, they did not do so.
154  The ASR 
regulation exempts LDTs from premarket notification and premarket approval requirements, but 
subjects the test ingredients to general quality controls and labeling requirements.
155  Although 
the ASR regulation helps assure the quality of the product used, it, like the CLIA regulations, 
does not address the clinical effectiveness of the test, or the safety concerns arising from the 
release of tests results to the public. 
2.  Recent FDA action with respect to DTC genetic testing services 
In June 2010, FDA demonstrated its intention to discontinue its practice of exempting DTC 
genetic test from premarket approval as LTDs.  It did so by sending letters to five DTC genetic 
testing companies.
156  The letters requested that these companies submit premarket approval 
applications to FDA, suggesting that FDA does indeed consider these tests to be Class III 
devices.
157  Further, some of the letters stated that FDA does not consider the DTC genetic tests 
at issue to be LTDs because “the [tests are] not developed by and used in a single laboratory.”
158  
Although two of the five letters sent by the FDA do not include the statement that FDA does not 
consider the test at issue to be an LTD, the fact that these companies nevertheless received a 
letter suggests that FDA may be considering excluding all DTC genetic tests from the LTD 
exemption, regardless of their definitional status as an LTD.
159  This move by FDA would allow 
for the most comprehensive regulation to date of DTC genetic tests.  
V.  Conclusion: FDA’s role in the future of DTC genetic test regulation 
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Given the potential dangers and problems with current DTC genetic testing services, it is clear 
that more stringent and consistent regulation is required to ensure that the products reaching the 
market are safe, effective, and yield accurate results that can be safely and properly used by 
consumers.  However, many of the potential avenues for regulating DTC genetic testing services 
are either inadequate or pose difficult implementation and enforcement challenges.  CLIA 
regulation currently does not have sufficiently specific or consistent proficiency standards for 
genetic testing due to the lack of a genetics subspecialty; more importantly, CLIA regulation 
does not address the clinical effectiveness of laboratory tests.
160  FTC regulation may regulate 
the claims made by DTC genetic testing services in advertising, but lacks jurisdiction to engage 
in more substantive regulation of the safety and effectiveness of the products.
161  Finally, state 
regulation lacks consistency and is difficult to enforce given that most providers of DTC genetic 
testing services sell their products over the internet.
162   
Because of the inadequacy of or challenges posed by these regulatory schemes, FDA 
regulation shows the most potential for providing a comprehensive and consistent regulatory 
environment for DTC genetic testing services.  Medical device regulation under the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act allows FDA to require premarket approval for the demonstration of safety and 
effectiveness where necessary, but also allows for flexibility via the medical device classification 
system.  Thus, if FDA chooses to classify a specific lower-risk genetic test as Class I or Class II, 
full premarket approval would not be required for that test.
163  For example, FDA official 
Alberto Gutierrez told the public media that a genetic test for baldness would in all likelihood be 
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classified as a Class I medical device not requiring premarket approval.
164  Further, as the safety 
and effectiveness of Class III DTC genetic tests are established, these tests can be down-
classified to Class II devices, allowing future marketers of these products to obtain approval 
simply by showing that their test is substantially similar to an approved test under 510(k) 
review.
165  This regulatory approach strikes the proper balance of regulation for genetic testing 
services that pose real risks to the public, while allowing for innovation and improvement in the 
genetic testing market by imposing less stringent regulation on safer tests. 
Eight years following the sequencing of the human genome project, and after many years 
of uncertainty in the regulation of DTC genetic test, FDA has taken the right approach by 
beginning to exercise jurisdiction over genetic testing services as Class III devices, and should 
continue to move down this path.  Courts should also construe the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
and the Medical Device Amendments so as to ensure that FDA may continue to exercise 
jurisdiction over DTC genetic testing companies.  In particular, DTC genetic tests should be 
considered as IVD medical devices under the jurisdiction of FDA and not falling under the LDT 
or other exemption.
166  This approach will help ensure that the public has access to safe and 
effective genetic testing products and that the important policy and public health issues created 
by DTC genetic testing are properly addressed. 
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